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primers they developed themselves. 
In addition, Southern hybridization 
was done. The results showed that 
SCCmec III ST398 MRSA isolates 
should be typed as SCCmec type V. In 
this conclusion we agree with the au-
thors. It seems clear that Zhang’s meth-
od incorrectly identifi ed 4 of the ani-
mal-related ST398 isolates as SCCmec 
type III instead of SCCmec type V. 
Whether all ST398 MRSA are SCCmec 
type IV or V remains unclear. Re-
cently, an article by Nemati et al. was 
published in which ST398 MRSA was 
also typed as SCCmec III (3). How-
ever, in that study the SCCmec typing 
method of Zhang was also used. 
In conclusion, the choice of 
SCCmec typing method is directly re-
lated to obtaining accurate SCCmec 
results for ST398 isolates. To date, al-
most all animal-related ST398 MRSA 
isolates are SCCmec types IV and V.
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School Closure to 
Reduce Infl uenza 
Transmission
To the Editor: Cowling et al. 
reported on the effects of school clo-
sure in Hong Kong, People’s Republic 
of China, during March 2008 in re-
sponse to infl uenza-related deaths of 
children (1). The infl uenza epidemic 
started in January 2008 and peaked in 
late February, but the 2-week school 
closure did not begin until March 12. 
Consequently, the school-based epi-
demic was on the decline by the time 
offi cials closed schools. Other studies 
have suggested that early school clo-
sures can help reduce infl uenza illness 
in the community and among school 
children, especially during a pandemic 
(2–6). However, surveillance systems 
that rely on school absenteeism or 
deaths would likely provide informa-
tion too late during the outbreak for 
school closure to effectively reduce 
infl uenza transmission. 
The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) has recom-
mended early closure of schools as a 
community mitigation measure in the 
event of a severe pandemic (7). Spe-
cifi cally, CDC recommends rapidly 
initiating activities such as advising 
sick persons to stay home, dismissing 
children from schools, closing child-
care facilities, and initiating further 
social distancing measures within a 
state or a community at the beginning 
of the upslope of a pandemic wave 
(acceleration interval), i.e., when cas-
es are initially identifi ed and commu-
nity transmission begins to occur (8). 
We concur with the authors that the 
2007–08 infl uenza season was already 
waning by the time the decision was 
made to close schools (deceleration 
interval). 
School closure used as a single 
pandemic control measure is predicted 
to be less effective than early, concur-
rent use of multiple measures. Socially 
disruptive measures like early school 
closure and keeping children from 
congregating in the community would 
likely reduce community transmission 
of pandemic disease, but would also 
create secondary challenges (9,10). 
Therefore, to ensure maximal benefi t 
for reducing disease transmission, in-
terventions should be implemented 
early and concomitantly with other 
nonpharmaceutical and pharmaceuti-
cal measures, accompanied by public 
education, and used judiciously based 
on pandemic severity. 
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In Response: We agree with 
Koonin and Cetron (1) that early ap-
plication of any intervention during 
an infl uenza epidemic or pandemic 
is critical in maximizing population 
health benefi ts. Further, the longer an 
intervention is sustained, the greater 
the likely benefi t. 
Whether surveillance data can in-
form public health interventions may 
depend on the timeliness of the data 
as well as the length of the epidemic. 
In tropical and subtropical settings, 
infl uenza tends to circulate longer. Al-
though duration of the epidemic could 
enable delayed interventions a chance 
of success, social distancing interven-
tions may need to be sustained to en-
sure that the epidemic does not revive 
when the intervention period ends.
One important study not men-
tioned by Koonin and Cetron is a nat-
ural experiment in France where the 
staggering of school holiday periods in 
different regions enabled Cauchemez 
et al. to estimate that school holidays 
prevent 16%–18% of seasonal infl u-
enza cases (2). In contrast to our study 
of a single school closure event in 
response to 1 seasonal outbreak, the 
French study considered preplanned 
holiday periods spanning many years.
Although pandemic plans often 
describe action to be taken depending 
on features in the epidemic curve (e.g., 
the acceleration interval as the upslope 
of the epidemic curve), we would ar-
gue that more focus should be given to 
underlying transmission dynamics. In 
our analysis of the effect of school clo-
sures in Hong Kong, we used a simple 
statistical technique (3) to estimate 
the underlying reproductive number. 
Changes in the epidemic curve may 
lag behind changes in the underlying 
transmission dynamics by at least 1 
serial interval, as has previously been 
shown for severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (3–5). Public health prac-
titioners must be encouraged to use 
these methods routinely. 
Finally, we concur that a multi-
pronged, targeted, layered approach 
will likely provide the best mitigation 
strategy in the event of a pandemic. 
However, we caution against confl at-
ing good public health practice of 
“pulling out all the stops” in the event 
of a pandemic with good scientifi c 
practice of evaluating the independent 
effect of school closures, which was 
the object of our article.
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